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Introduction
Within the Australian fire and emergency management 
sector, the concept of ‘shared responsibility’ is most 
commonly used to refer to the need for communities 
to be more self-reliant in the face of risks associated 
with natural hazards such as bushfire and flood. It 
reflects a strong recognition that public expectations 
and demands of emergency services in Australia may 
be unrealistically high, and that communities have a 
vital role to play in securing their own safety. However, 
this represents a specific understanding of a more 
general idea: one that is embedded in a particular 
context, place and time. A broader view that compares 
the goals and processes of sharing responsibility 
across a wider range of risk and safety contexts may 
therefore provide some valuable food for thought about 
confronting local challenges. 
In this paper, we therefore look beyond Australian  
fire and emergency management to compare ways  
that responsibility-sharing – broadly conceived –  
has occurred in other places and sectors where 
risks to community safety are faced. Importantly, 
finding ways to share responsibility amongst multiple 
parties, and particularly between governments and 
communities, is a challenge faced across a wide range 
of sectors. Risk research literature abounds with 
studies that expose responsibility-sharing dilemmas in 
fields such as air pollution (Bickerstaff & Walker 2002), 
public health (Guttman & Ressler 2001), workplace 
safety (Gray 2009), food safety (Henderson, Coveney 
& Ward 2010), transportation (Sanne 2008), policing 
(Hughes & Rowe 2007), and new technologies (Black 
& Wishart 2008). We reviewed a broad sample of this 
literature in order to examine by what mechanisms 
responsibility-sharing was shaped. A more detailed 
account of the review and how it was undertaken is 
available elsewhere [McLennan & Handmer 2011b]. 
In this paper, we focus on conceptualising the idea 
of shared responsibility in a more general, context-
independent way, presenting key results, and outlining 
broad implications from this cross-sectoral review for 
Australian fire and emergency management.
Responsibility-sharing institutions
To begin, we need to be clear about what we mean by 
‘shared responsibility’. We take a broader view than 
the understanding most common in Australian fire and 
emergency management. 
In the context of risk, the concept of responsibility 
incorporates the notion that certain parties have  
an obligation (be this moral, social or legal) to 
undertake actions to manage risk, either their own 
or someone else’s [McLennan & Handmer 2011a, 2012]. 
These obligations stem from the expectations, rules, 
and norms in society about the roles of various parties 
with respect to risk (see also Birnbacher 2001).  
They are forward-looking because they exist prior  
Changing the rules of the game: 
mechanisms that shape responsibility-
sharing from beyond Australian fire and 
emergency management.
By Blythe McLennan and John Handmer,  
Centre for Risk and Community Safety, RMIT University.
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we look beyond Australian 
fire and emergency management to 
compare ways that responsibility-sharing 
– broadly conceived – has occurred 
in other places and sectors where 
risks to community safety are faced. 
Responsibility-sharing occurs any time 
there is collective action, and formal 
and informal institutions provide the 
“rules of the game” that prescribe how 
responsibility should be shared amongst 
the parties involved. We reviewed a broad 
sample of risk research literature in 
order to examine by what mechanisms 
responsibility-sharing institutions 
have been shaped in other places and 
sectors where risks to community safety 
are faced. Our review revealed more 
alternatives for shaping responsibility-
sharing institutions than are widely 
considered by policy and decision 
makers in Australian fire and emergency 
management. It therefore raises an 
important question about why certain 
mechanisms are chosen, prioritised, 
overlooked or resisted in this sector. 
An alternative way of conceiving and 
pursuing shared responsibility is  
also discussed.  
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to and irrespective of the event or conditions that give 
rise to them (Birnbacher 2001; Pulcini 2010). A party 
may be found to have failed to live up to the widely-held 
expectations, rules and norms that place obligations 
on them. When this happens, they are likely to be held 
accountable for the consequences once the risk is 
realised and the outcomes of risk management are not 
what people expected or desired. They are also likely to 
face some form of sanctions, formally or informally, for 
their perceived failure (Pellizzoni 2004; Witt 2001).
Responsibility-sharing therefore occurs when multiple 
parties have obligations with respect to the same goal, 
outcome or field of action. Another way to say this is 
that responsibility is shared any time there is collective 
action. Broadly speaking, collective action occurs 
when a group, whether of individuals or organisations, 
works together to achieve a mutual goal (Ostrom 1990; 
Sandler & Blume 1992). The notion is usually invoked 
when goals are not achievable through individual 
actions alone (e.g. in an uncoordinated way), but rather 
can only be achieved when a group coordinates to 
work together. The idea that increasing community 
bushfire safety in Australia requires collective action 
involving agencies and communities is not unfamiliar. 
For example, it was indicated strongly in the Victorian 
2009 Bushfires Royal Commission’s view of ‘shared 
responsibility’. The Royal Commission stated, for 
example, that “individuals and communities also play 
an important part in contributing to community safety 
during bushfires, but they need support from the State 
and from municipal councils” (Teague, McLeod & 
Pascoe 2010, Vol. 2, p. 352). This emphasises the need 
for state agencies, municipal councils, individuals and 
communities to work together [McLennan & Handmer 
2012]. Beyond bushfire, collective action is also  
central to many flood management activities.  
Take, for example, the construction of levees on 
multiple properties, for which property owners  
must work together in a coordinated way, usually 
through a coordinating entity that has some degree  
of government authority.
Yet the general concept of shared responsibility – 
and also the particular one widely held in Australian 
fire and emergency management – does not say 
anything about how such collective action ought to 
be undertaken. Exactly how should the parties work 
together? What relationships should they have with 
each other, and what particular obligations does each 
party have with respect to their mutual goal? Further, 
what are the standards for determining when one party 
or another has failed to live up to their obligations? In 
order that the parties can respond to such questions, 
collective action needs some kind of guidance: some 
“rules of the game” for people to follow. These rules 
are provided by institutions, usefully defined as 
“prescriptions that specify what actions (or outcomes) 
are required, prohibited or permitted and the sanctions 
authorized if the rules are not followed” (Ostrom & 
Ahn 2009, p. 28). Laws, policies and programs are all 
examples of formal institutions or “rules of the game” 
that prescribe what is required, prohibited or permitted 
in collective action in various fields. These formal 
institutions are codified or written down and back up by 
some degree of formal authority. However, institutions 
guiding collective action can also be informal. Social 
norms and expectations, cultural values, and social 
relationships of reciprocity are all examples of informal 
institutions that are not written down nor formally 
authorised but which none-the-less influence the way 
people work together: often in powerful and significant 
ways. For example, a study by Brenkert-Smith (2010) 
shows how social interaction between neighbours in 
wildland-urban interface communities help to build 
informal social norms that support activities to reduce 
wildfire risk, such as periodic clearing of brush and 
undergrowth. Importantly, both formal and informal 
institutions are commonly backed up by sanctions. In 
the case of laws, these are legal sanctions, whereas in 
the case of social norms, the sanctions are also social, 
such as public shaming or social exclusion. 
Many of the institutions that guide collective  
action prescribe how responsibility should be  
shared amongst some or all of the parties involved. 
The Emergency Management Act 1986 (Victoria) is one 
example of a formal, in this case legislative, institution 
that spells out the powers and responsibilities of 
various government parties with respect to “the 
organisation and management of resources for dealing 
with all aspects of emergencies”1. Informal institutions 
that shape how responsibility is shared for dealing 
with emergencies also exist in Australian societies. 
As historian Tom Griffiths (2010, p. 35.4) notes in the 
context of bushfire, Australian culture tends to define 
heroism as “staying and fighting”. Griffiths highlights 
how “leaving early, in such a culture, might be seen to 
be cowardly” (p. 35.4). Such cultural beliefs can shape 
people’s personal sense of their obligations to ‘stay and 
defend’ when a bushfire looms: individual households 
as much as fire-fighting volunteers. A second related 
example is social norms regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of men and women, which also shape 
how people plan for and respond to bushfire (Eriksen, 
Gill & Head 2010). 
Importantly, different institutions concerning the 
same field of collective action do not always align 
in mutually reinforcing ways. So for example, the 
formal emergency management responsibilities 
laid out in different policies or pieces of legislation 
may conflict, as they do in Australia when it comes 
to the role and authority of the police in evacuations 
(Handmer & Tibbits 2005; Tibbits & Whittaker 2007). 
Formal and informal institutions may also collide, 
for example when local social norms discourage the 
clearing of trees around homes while fire agency 
policies support the maintenance of defensible space 
(Bushnell & Cottrell 2007). Formal and informal 
institutions regarding professional roles may also 
conflict in workplaces. One example from the field 
of workplace safety is misalignment between formal 
safety regulations that require near miss incidents 
1.  From page 4 of version 044 of the Act, incorporating amendments as at 3 November 2011.
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to be reported and organisational cultures that may 
discourage ‘dobbing in’ workmates. Furthermore, 
existing institutions – both formal and informal – may 
be found ill-fitting for new, unfamiliar or rare risk 
scenarios. This was arguably the case with the Black 
Saturday bushfires. Because of their ferocity, the fires 
were found by the Royal Commission to have exceeded 
the scope and capacity of existing policies and 
procedures (Teague, McLeod & Pascoe Vol. 2, 2010). 
These examples show how conflict and ambiguity 
can easily arise over where responsibility lies in risk 
management and over how to determine when a party 
has failed to act in accordance with their obligations. 
Changing and clarifying the way responsibility is 
shared, either generally or for specific conditions, 
therefore means altering the institutions (e.g. laws, 
regulations, workplace cultures or social expectations) 
that prescribe the obligations of the various parties 
engaged in collective action. We use the term 
‘mechanisms’ to refer to any process that shapes  
some type of responsibility-sharing institution,  
be it formal or informal. Such mechanisms may  
be directed and intended (e.g. making a law,  
or implementing a program) or emergent and 
unintended (e.g. constructing a social norm, resisting 
a cultural value). While governments have a key role in 
shaping institutions, they are not the only parties that 
can bring about – either intentionally or unintentionally 
–institutional change. Political dynamics, overseas 
events and the media, for example, all have the 
potential to influence social expectations of the roles  
of fire and emergency management agencies and of 
the anticipated outcomes of risk management. 
Mechanisms to share responsibility
In order to consider possible ways that conflicts and 
ambiguities regarding shared responsibility might 
be approached in Australian fire and emergency 
management, we therefore asked the question: By what 
mechanisms are responsibility-sharing institutions 
created or altered in the context of risk and community 
safety elsewhere? To answer this question, we reviewed 
studies in the risk research literature that described or 
proposed changes in risk management and community 
safety responsibilities [McLennan & Handmer 2011b]. 
The review was carried out as part of a research 
project being undertaken for the Bushfire Cooperative 
Research Centre2. In addition to fire and emergency 
management, the sectors covered by the review 
included public health, environmental risk, public 
security and policing, human services, social welfare, 
workplace safety, new technologies and transportation 
[see McLennan & Handmer 2011b, Appendix]. 
The review revealed seven broad types of  
mechanisms that have shaped, or been proposed  
to shape, responsibility-sharing institutions in a  
range of scenarios involving risk and community safety. 
These are listed below in Table 1. The examples given 
in this table are not a complete list of possible ways to 
shape responsibility-sharing, and hence the Table is not 
a ‘shopping list’ of alternatives. While we endeavoured to 
seek the widest possible range of mechanisms, we were 
limited by the scenarios, research goals and conceptual 
approaches of the reviewed studies. Further, we did not 
include mechanisms that have not yet been used in the 
context of risk and community safety, which might reveal 
innovative new approaches. 
2.  See http://www.bushfirecrc.com/projects/1-3/sharing-responsibility-component-mainstreaming-fire-and-emergency-management-across-pol.
January 24, 2012: Melbourne, VIC. Members of the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board (MFB) tackle a grass 
fire at Westmeadows in Melbourne, Victoria.
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Each of the seven types of mechanism will be 
familiar to fire and emergency management 
stakeholders but not necessarily in the context of 
thinking about shared responsibility for community 
safety. Within each type, there will also be some 
examples that are very familiar and others that are 
far less so (see Table 2 for less familiar examples). 
Within the category of ‘vision statements’, the 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG 
2011) is one example of a policy strategy that is 
very well-known to Australian fire and emergency 
management. However, social and ethical codes, 
while common at the level of particular professional 
groups, have not been used at the larger-scale level 
of government-community relationships as they 
have been in other contexts. Similarly, there are less 
familiar examples of each of the other types  
of mechanisms.
Table 1: Overview of mechanisms for sharing responsibility [McLennan & Handmer 2011b]
Type Examples Influence on responsibility-sharing
Vision statements • National strategies and policies
• Statements of principle
• Mission statements
• Social and ethical codes
• Non-binding declarations of rights
Steer and mobilise responsibility-
sharing by outlining what it should 
achieve or look like (not strongly 
enforced or formally agreed to by the 
parties involved). 
‘Hard’ laws and 
regulations
• Constitutions
• Charters
• New, amended or extended laws
• Traditional regulation
• Quasi-regulation (enforced)
Prescribe and compel responsibility-
sharing through the use of legal 
obligations and authorised sanctions/
penalties.
‘Soft’ 
interventions
• Financial incentives and disincentives 
• Direct government delivery of public services
• Quasi-regulation (voluntary)
• Monitoring and evaluation systems
• Informational/persuasive campaigns
Encourage responsibility-sharing by 
influencing decision-making, behaviour 
or access to services and resources.
Contracts & 
agreements
• Treaties and conventions
• Legally-binding voluntary contracts
• Public/private partnerships
• Hybrid public/private administration 
• Voluntary non-binding agreements
• Agreed declarations of intent
• Social relationships of reciprocity 
Establish relationships for 
responsibility-sharing and clarify what 
is expected of the parties involved (may 
be binding and subject to penalty or 
non-binding and without penalty).
Collective inquiry 
& decision-
making
• Votes
• Formal public inquiries – binding
• Formal public inquiries – non-binding
• Public consultation
• Deliberative/collaborative decision-making
• Participatory disaster/risk management
Collectively query and/or decide where 
responsibility lies and/or how to share it.
Organisations & 
associations
• New department, committee or overseeing body
• Restructure of existing agencies/institutions
• Government-initiated community or industry 
associations
• Self-initiated civic or industry associations
• Multi-party partnerships and collaborations
• Policy networks
• Interagency coordination and collaboration
Change or strengthen relationships 
amongst parties to facilitate 
responsibility-sharing, or create 
authority to influence responsibility-
sharing.
Social norms • Workplace/professional culture 
• Traditional knowledge/management regimes
• Emergent organisation and leaders
• Social movement/ protest
Establish informal, shared rules of 
engagement to share responsibility 
and/or impose social incentives and 
sanctions.
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There is inevitably overlap and interaction amongst  
the seven types of mechanisms. For example,  
the goal of collective decision-making could be  
to create a voluntary contract or agreement.  
The creation of a new department or organisation 
is often accompanied by the crafting of a new vision 
statement of some kind. Alternatively, policies and 
programs might aim to influence social norms as  
in the case of persuasive/ informational campaigns 
that seek to facilitate risk-reducing social norms. 
Multiple mechanisms are also often actioned together.  
For example, complex policy packages may involve a 
combination of legal, regulatory, organisational and 
program delivery mechanisms. In any particular risk 
management scenario, it is most likely that alterations 
to multiple institutions would be needed to bring about 
any lasting change to the way responsibility is shared. 
This type of change cannot be affected through a 
single, agency-directed mechanism. 
Food for thought
Our review revealed more alternatives for shaping 
responsibility-sharing institutions than are widely 
considered by policy and decision makers in Australian 
fire and emergency management. It therefore raises 
an important question about why certain mechanisms 
are chosen, prioritised, overlooked or resisted in 
this sector. Of course, different types of mechanisms 
are more or less suited to different scenarios and 
conditions. It is doubtful, for example, that new 
legislation compelling evacuation from high-risk 
areas on days of catastrophic or code red fire danger 
would be politically or socially acceptable in Australia. 
Assessing the suitability of a given mechanism for a 
specific issue or scenario would require more in-depth 
examination than was possible within the scope of 
this review. Yet we can still ask the more general 
question: why are particular mechanisms on the radar 
in Australian fire and emergency management while 
others are not? 
As outlined above, ‘shared responsibility’ is most 
commonly used in Australian fire and emergency 
management to refer to the need for communities to 
be more self-reliant in preparing for and responding 
to hazard events. Further, ‘communities’ are conceived 
primarily as households and individuals. In this context, 
the pursuit of shared responsibility by agencies is 
likely to prioritise efforts to change the behaviour 
of individuals and households in ways that promote 
their greater self-reliance. By far the most common 
approach taken by agencies to do this in the past has 
been through persuasive education and awareness 
programs, described by Elsworth et al. (2009) as 
“top down” (as opposed to ‘bottom up”) community 
bushfire safety programs (p. 18). However, persuasive 
programs aimed at changing people’s behaviour are 
not the only approaches that might be pursued to share 
responsibility. Nor is greater community self-reliance 
the only way of conceiving the goal.
An alternative way of conceiving ‘shared responsibility’ 
could be to refer to the need to develop and strengthen 
responsibility-sharing institutions that cross some of the 
conventional divides in Australian fire and emergency 
management. This view is arguably more in line with 
the “whole-of-nation, resilience-based approach” 
called for in the Council of Australian Government’s 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (COAG 2011). 
A similar view was indicated in a speech to the fire and 
Table 2: Less familiar examples of mechanisms to share responsibility  
(Note: inclusion in this table does not indicate a recommendation of ‘best practice’.) 
Type of mechanism Less familiar examples
Vision statements Social and ethical codes – e.g. the vision for ‘social co-responsibility’ in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (UNDP & ILO 2009)
‘Hard’ laws and regulation Charters – e.g. the Council of Europe’s proposed charter of shared social 
responsibilities (Council of Europe 2011)
‘Soft’ interventions Informational/persuasive campaigns co-designed with target groups – e.g. the 
‘Helping Each other Act Responsibly Together’ campaign in Zambia to reduce HIV 
risk amongst young people (Underwood et al. 2006)
Contracts and agreements Voluntary, non-binding agreements between government agencies and private 
parties – e.g. the UK Department of Health’s ‘responsibility pledges’ (UK Department 
of Health 2011)
Collective inquiry and 
decision-making
Deliberative decision-making with stakeholders – e.g. the “ethical assessment” 
process used by the UK Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (Cotton 2009)
Organisations and 
associations
Community recovery coordination roles taken on by existing community 
organisations – e.g. cultural/religious groups’ activities following Hurricane Katrina 
(Patterson, Weil & Patel 2010)
Social norms Change in workplace/professional culture – e.g. Swedish railway technician 
workplace culture that negotiated conflicting commitments to workplace and public 
transportation safety (Sanne 2008) 
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emergency management sector by the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, Roger 
Wilkins, AO. (Wilkins 2010). In his speech, the Secretary 
emphasised the need for coordination that transcends 
boundaries between: agencies and departments; public 
and private sectors; international, regional, national and 
local levels; professional and traditional skills groups; 
and professionals and volunteers. We suggest that 
boundaries between agency-directed and community-
based initiatives be added to the list. 
The pursuit of this different view of ‘shared 
responsibility’ would likely prioritise different 
mechanisms compared to the current situation 
in Australia. It might include changes to existing 
organisations and associations (and the creation of  
new ones), the formation of contracts and agreements, 
and engagement in collective decision-making 
processes. It would also likely involve more deep-
seated changes to social norms. Within these types of 
mechanisms, communities and other non-government 
parties would have a greater role in shaping 
responsibility-sharing alongside agencies and other 
professional risk managers. In ‘top down’ community 
bushfire safety programs, for example, communities 
have predominantly been seen as targets of agency-led 
campaigns rather than co-implementers or goal-setters 
(although this is less the case for emerging ‘bottom-up’ 
community engagement and development strategies, 
see Elsworth et al. 2009). Where mechanisms such as 
contracts and agreements, and collective decision-
making are prioritised more strongly, communities and 
non-government parties are more likely to have active 
roles in implementation and goal-setting. 
This highlights a major distinction identified in 
our review of the mechanisms that have shaped 
responsibility-sharing in other contexts. On one hand, 
mechanisms such as vision statements, ‘hard’ laws 
and regulations, and ‘soft’ interventions focus more 
heavily on shaping responsibility-sharing to align 
with a pre-determined standard or goal. On the other 
hand, mechanisms such as contracts and agreements, 
collective inquiry and decision-making, organisations 
and associations, and social norms are more likely to 
include a process for determining or negotiating goals 
and standards. In the latter case, there is more scope 
for those who are at-risk to be involved in shaping 
responsibility-sharing institutions that structure 
collective action for community safety and  
risk management.
While we are supportive of this alternative view of 
shared responsibility, we do not mean to suggest 
that the more common view in Australian fire and 
emergency management that prioritises community 
self-reliance is necessarily incorrect or misguided. 
By contrast, given the claim that communities rely too 
heavily on fire and emergency management agencies 
in Australian society, the focus on community self-
reliance may be well-founded. However, we do mean  
to suggest that this view may be overly particular.  
The dominance of a particular, more narrowly focused 
view of shared responsibility curtails the consideration 
of a wider range of possible ways to think about  
and shape responsibility-sharing in this sector.  
The more familiar mechanisms, such as persuasive 
education and awareness programs, may well be most 
appropriate to address some responsibility-sharing 
issues. However, reflecting on a wider range  
of alternative mechanisms could help fire and 
emergency management stakeholders and decision 
makers to consider the pros and cons of other, 
otherwise overlooked possibilities, which may be 
appropriate for addressing a wider range of issues.  
On a deeper level, it may also assist them to recognise 
and reflect on some of their own assumptions about 
what ‘shared responsibility’ means as a goal and as 
a process, about the nature of collective action in 
risk management, and about relationships between 
‘those-at-risk’ and ‘those-in-authority’ [see McLennan 
& Handmer 2012]. Given the impetus of the National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience, this broader reflection 
is particularly warranted in Australian fire and 
emergency management at the moment. 
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